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Abstract
Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no 
other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at 
the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is mor-
ally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert 
that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and 
moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and 
those earlier directly free actions formed him into the kind of person who must 
refrain from recanting. Surprisingly, libertarians have not developed a full account 
of indirectly free actions. I provide a more developed account. First, I explain the 
metaphysical nature of indirectly free actions such as Luther’s. Second, I examine 
the kind of metaphysical and epistemic connections that must occur between past 
directly free actions and the indirectly free action. Third, I argue that an attrac-
tive way to understand the kind of derivative moral responsibility at issue involves 
affirming the existence of resultant moral luck.
Libertarianism is the view that free will is incompatible with causal determinism 
and that human beings at least sometimes act freely.1 A prominent family of liber-
tarian views that Randolph Clarke (2000, p. 23) identifies as “action-centered” are 
distinguished by the claim that an agent acts freely only if she has alternative pos-
sibilities open to her at the moment of choice.
Daniel Dennett (1984) has famously offered alleged counterexamples to action-
centered libertarianism. For example, Martin Luther refuses to recant his theologi-
cal views by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther spoke 
truly, he lacked alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, but, intuitively, he 
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is morally responsible for his action.2 Thus, there are cases with respect to which 
action-centered libertarians appear to be committed to three jointly inconsistent 
claims: (i) Luther is morally responsible for the action, (ii) Luther’s being morally 
responsible for the action requires that it is a free action, and (iii) Luther does not act 
freely because he could not have done otherwise at the moment of choice.
Action-centered libertarians (hereafter, libertarians) can respond in two basic 
ways. On the one hand, they can deny (i). That is, they can deny the intuition that 
Luther acts freely and morally responsibly.3 On the other hand, they can deny (ii) 
or (iii). In other words, they can accommodate the intuition that Luther is at least 
morally responsible for his refusal either by affirming that people can be morally 
responsible for certain kinds of actions that are not free actions (van Inwagen 1989) 
or by affirming that certain kinds of free actions do not involve alternative possi-
bilities at the moment of choice (Kane 1996b).4 What these latter two views have 
in common is that they trace Luther’s moral responsibility for the refusal to ear-
lier character-forming actions when he had alternative possibilities at the moment of 
choice. I focus on the Robert Kane-style version of this tracing response, and return 
to the disagreement between him and Peter van Inwagen in the next section. Making 
sense of Luther’s free and morally responsible refusal, then, involves distinguish-
ing between directly and indirectly free actions. An agent performs a directly free 
action only if she has alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. And an agent 
performs an indirectly free action only if she has performed directly free actions in 
the past, and those past directly free actions have cultivated character for which she 
is morally responsible such that her will is set one-way in the present circumstance.
Libertarians such as Kane (1996b), Timothy O’Connor (2009), Timothy Pawl 
and Kevin Timpe (2009, 2013), Timpe (2011, 2014), van Inwagen (1989), and Dean 
Zimmerman (2011) embrace the basic distinction between what I am calling directly 
and indirectly free actions (although at least some of them think that what I am call-
ing ‘indirectly free actions’ are more aptly labeled ‘indirectly morally responsible 
actions’). Refer to this group as Indirect Libertarians.
Nevertheless, Indirect Libertarians to date have developed only partial accounts 
of indirectly free actions. This is surprising precisely because they assign indirectly 
free actions a central role in their accounts of morally responsible agency. Addition-
ally, an account of indirectly free actions is important for theistic libertarians who 
3 Here is an interesting way to explore the denial of (i): Luther is not accountable responsible for his 
practically necessitated action, but he is attributable responsible. Whether this suggestion is plausible 
depends on whether attributability is a genuine kind of moral responsibility (see Jeppsson forthcoming; 
Shoemaker 2015; Watson 1996).
4 Yet another option would be to affirm that Luther can be praiseworthy for the refusal, because there is 
an asymmetry between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness such that only blameworthiness requires 
alternative possibilities at the moment of choice (cf. Wolf 1990; Nelkin 2011).
2 Frankfurt (1971) has offered a different kind of counterexample to the alternative possibilities require-
ment that I ignore in this essay. Nevertheless, the libertarianism that I develop presupposes that Frank-
furt-style counterexamples are unsuccessful.
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believe that freely developing character before death is vital to explaining why we 
can act freely and morally responsibly in heaven, a state in which it is impossible to 
do wrong (Brown 2015; Pawl and Timpe 2009, 2013; Sennett 1999; Timpe 2014; 
Zimmerman 2011).
In this paper, I provide a more developed account of indirectly free actions. The 
contribution I make is to compile disparate and partial accounts into a fuller account, 
refine some of the partial accounts to make them more plausible, and fill in gaps left 
by the compilation of these partial accounts. I proceed as follows. First, I explicate 
relevant parts of the metaphysical nature of an indirectly free action. Second, I offer 
an account of the metaphysical contribution that an agent must have made through 
her past directly free actions to perform an indirectly free action. Third, I provide 
an account of the epistemic connection an agent must have had between her past 
directly free actions and her indirectly free action. Fourth, I argue that an attractive 
way to understand the degree of an agent’s derivative moral responsibility for an 
indirectly free action requires accepting resultant moral luck.
Three preliminary points are in order. First, for the purposes of exploring the 
nature of indirectly free actions, I assume that directly free actions are unproblem-
atic. Thus, I set aside well-known difficulties such as the luck objection to liber-
tarianism (see Levy 2011; Mele 2006; van Inwagen 2002). Second, because I 
assume that directly free actions are unproblematic, I leave their metaphysical nature 
unspecified; I do not enter intermural debates between agent-causal and event-cas-
ual libertarians. Third, although I intend the account of indirectly free actions that 
I develop to be for libertarians, it can apply mutatis mutandis to history-sensitive 
compatibilists such as John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998, p. 50), who 
also endorse the idea that indirectly free actions are important in a general account 
of moral responsibility.
1  The Nature of Indirectly Free Actions
I begin with some terminology. I use the term practical necessity to refer to a cluster of 
dispositions of sufficient strength such that the agent with those dispositions must act or 
omit acting in a particular kind of way in certain circumstances. A practical necessity 
is roughly the same idea as Harry Frankfurt’s (1988, p. 86) “volitional necessity” and 
Bernard Williams’s (1993, p. 59) “moral incapacity.”5 I use the term practically neces-
sitated action for an action that an agent must perform in certain circumstances because 
of her practical necessity. Lastly, I define the term indirectly free action to refer to any 
practically necessitated action for which an agent is praiseworthy, blameworthy, or neu-
tral-value-worthy. The difference between practically necessitated actions and indirectly 
free actions is that only the latter must have the kind of history that confers praisewor-
thiness, blameworthiness, or neutral-value-worthiness to them from earlier directly free 
actions.
5 For an explication of the nuanced differences between Frankfurt’s volitional necessity and Williams’s 
moral incapacity, see Watson (2004, ch. 4).
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One theme in Frankfurt and Williams is that practical necessities are importantly 
related to an agent’s character and reasons. Frankfurt (1988, p. 86) asserts that Luther’s 
reasons were “too good” to do anything else, and Williams (1993, p. 65) maintains that 
Luther’s reasons were “totally decisive” (cf. Dennett 1984; Kane 1996b; O’Connor 
2009; Pawl and Timpe 2009; Stump 1999; Timpe 2014; Zimmerman 2011). Although it 
would be interesting to analyze the metaphysics of exactly how the agent’s reasons prac-
tically necessitate the indirectly free action, I do not take on that project in the interest 
of exploring other questions. I follow Timpe’s (2014) appeal to van Inwagen’s (1989, p. 
407) principle that describes a conditional relationship between certain kinds of charac-
ter and reasons, on the one hand, and a practically necessitated action, on the other:
If X regards A as an indefensible act, given the totality of relevant information 
available to him, and if he has no way of getting further relevant information, 
and if he lacks any positive desire to do A, and if he sees no objection to not 
doing A (again, given the totality of relevant information available to him), 
then X is not going to do A (italics in original).6
Two points are worth highlighting. First, van Inwagen (1989, p. 409) equates the 
force of ‘X is not going to do A’ in the consequent with ‘X cannot perform A’. Sec-
ond, this principle is about what a person omits doing, but the same point applies 
to what a person does: so, if X regards A-ing as the only defensible act (given the 
totality of available information and there is no way to get more), if X desires to A, 
and if X has no objection to A-ing (given the totality of available information), then 
X must perform A. For example, a mother is offered a nickel to cut up her daughter 
into tiny pieces; she refuses the offer and could not have accepted it (Stump 1999, 
p. 323). Since the mother (i) believes refusing the offer is the only defensible action 
(given all of her information and believes that is no way to gather more), (ii) desires 
to refuse the offer, (iii) believes that there is no objection to refusing the offer (again, 
given all of her information), she must refuse the offer. Supposing that we under-
stand reasons as pairs of beliefs and desires, the conditional illustrates the way in 
which X’s reasons constrain X’s action (Timpe 2014).
Given that practically necessitated actions are determined by the agent’s reasons 
and character and that libertarians think that free will is incompatible with determin-
ism, is an indirectly free action a misnomer? Van Inwagen (1989, p. 418) believes 
that what I have called a ‘directly free action’ is the only kind of free action there is. 
Other philosophers who agree with van Inwagen are nevertheless happy to refer to 
indirectly free actions as actions that are “in a sense” free (O’Connor 2009, p. 122) 
or “freely undertaken” (Zimmerman 2011, p. 177). Yet other philosophers including 
Kane (1996b) and Pawl and Timpe (2009, p. 400) suggest that there are different kinds 
of free actions, and so are glad to countenance indirectly free actions as a bona fide 
kind of free action. Plausibly, the issue here is whether to define free action in terms of 
the control required for moral responsibility or in terms of a more robustly metaphysi-
cal notion concerning alternative possibilities. I side with Kane, Pawl, and Timpe, but 
6 Van Inwagen (1989, p. 407) builds into the antecedent that the agent is at least minimally practically 
rational, and, thus, the conditional does not apply to “berserk” agents who act for no reason.
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those who follow van Inwagen can substitute ‘indirectly morally responsible actions’ 
for ‘indirectly free actions.’ In the next section, I consider the following question: what 
kind of metaphysical contribution must the agent have made via past directly free 
actions to be morally responsible for a present practically necessitated action?
2  The Metaphysical History Condition
In general, Indirect Libertarians do not say much about the kind of metaphysical 
contribution that the agent must have made to her character via past directly free 
actions. Van Inwagen (1989, p. 420) recites the platitude about having performed 
past directly free actions that influenced the practical necessity. Pawl and Timpe 
(2009), Timpe (2014), and Zimmerman (2011, pp. 176–177) say little more. Kane 
(1996a, b), however, makes explicit two historical conditions for indirectly free 
actions that other Indirect Libertarians tacitly assume. After I present Kane’s two 
conditions (one negative and one positive), I offer two more.
Kane’s (1996a, p. 82) negative condition is that the agent’s directly free actions 
need not be the only cause of the practical necessity: “Of course, for Luther to be 
responsible for his character and motives does not mean that he must have been their 
sole and complete cause, as we said, or created them ex nihilo.” Thus, the agent 
need not be morally responsible for the whole practical necessity for it to generate 
an indirectly free action. I suggest also that to be fully morally responsible for an 
indirectly free action, one need not be morally responsible for the whole practical 
necessity from which it issues. In terms of Thomas Nagel’s (1979, p. 28) categories, 
being fully morally responsible for the indirectly free action is compatible with the 
practical necessity’s being “constitutively lucky” to some degree; constitutive luck 
occurs when an agent has a disposition, capacity, or temperament that is at least in 
part non-voluntarily acquired.7 So, at least one whole disposition or disposition part 
need not be formed by directly free actions in a disposition cluster that constitutes 
the practical necessity that gives rise to an indirectly free action.8
7 I assume the lack of control account of luck in this paper; see Hartman (2017, pp. 23–31) for a defense 
(see also Anderson forthcoming; Riggs forthcoming; Statman forthcoming). For rival views of luck and 
their defenses, see Church and Hartman (forthcoming).
8 It is worth noting that different sources of luck can also affect whether a person develops a practical 
necessity. The constitutive and circumstantial luck that affect actions and omissions can indirectly affect 
a person’s dispositions. Because a person’s non-voluntarily acquired dispositions incline her to perform 
various kinds of action and disincline her to perform others, her constitutive luck affects which directly 
free actions she performs or forgoes. Additionally, circumstantial luck occurs when the morally signifi-
cant challenges an agent faces are beyond her control (Nagel 1979, p. 28), and this kind of luck also 
inclines the agent to perform or forgo certain kinds of directly free actions. Even micro-features of cir-
cumstances can have this affect (Doris 2002; Miller 2013). And since the kinds of actions and omissions 
one performs produce certain kinds of changes or maintenance in her dispositions, these kinds of luck 
can indirectly affect her dispositions. Furthermore, resultant luck, or luck in how a person’s action turns 
out, can also indirectly affect her dispositions (Nagel 1979, p. 28). For example, a person with disposi-
tions to be helpful may decide to assist someone with an apparent need, but, after she takes the bait and 
is mugged, the way her action turns out affects her dispositions such that she becomes disillusioned with 
helping strangers (Matheson 2017, pp. 302–304).
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Kane’s (1996a, p. 77) positive condition is that past directly free actions or omis-
sions must have made a difference to the agent’s character such that the practi-
cal necessity counterfactually depends on having performed those free actions or 
omissions:
For you to be responsible for your will’s already being set the way it is, some 
of your past actions must have ‘made a difference’ in the sense that they were 
parts of the actual web of causes and conditions that resulted in your will’s 
being set the way it is, and if these actions of yours had not been parts of that 
web of causes and conditions, it would not have resulted in your will’s being 
set the way it is.
So, the agent must have performed past directly free actions that have “made a dif-
ference” to a disposition that eventually helped to form the practical necessity (cf. 
Kane 1996b, pp. 35, 39–40); if the agent had not directly freely acted or omitted in 
the way that she did, she would not have formed the practical necessity that neces-
sitates her indirectly free action.
While I accept both of Kane’s conditions, they do not adequately discriminate 
the degree of a person’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for an indirectly free 
action. I appeal to two case pairs to motivate the need for further conditions.
First, consider Chuck and Instant Chuck. Alfred Mele (2006) introduces Chuck 
as someone who is wholeheartedly murderous. In his youth, Chuck had the bad 
constitutive luck to enjoy torturing animals. Even so, he had the good constitutive 
luck to feel guilty before, during, and after the torturing event, which provided many 
occasions for him to reconsider his ways. In part because he valued being unfettered 
by conventional morality, he set out to squelch that guilty disposition by torturing 
animals and by bullying vulnerable persons. After enough time on this reformation 
program, we may suppose that Chuck is one action away from developing a prac-
tical necessity to murder in certain circumstances. Additionally, suppose that God 
creates Instant Chuck, who is a distinct person that comes into being at that instant, 
as a perfect duplicate of Chuck (but with fake memories). So, Instant Chuck is also 
one action away from developing a practical necessity to murder. Both Chuck and 
Instant Chuck perform the action, develop the practical necessity, and indirectly 
freely murder someone soon after. They both satisfy Kane’s metaphysical conditions 
for indirectly free actions. They perform directly free actions that make a difference 
to their practical necessities and their practical necessities counterfactually depend 
on their directly free choices. As O’Connor (2009, p. 123) would rightly point out, 
however, there is a moral difference between them.9 I indicate what this difference is 
after the next pair of cases.
Second, consider Revamped Joe and Slow-Developing Joe. Revamped Joe is an 
average human being, and is not particularly generous. He has an opportunity to 
take a pill that would create in him a kind of wholehearted generosity. He is torn. 
9 I suspect that compatibilists who adopt mutatis mutandis my account of indirectly free actions may not 
agree with this claim, and so may not want to add what I will explicate as the third metaphysical condi-
tion. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this footnote.
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But he takes it, and is revamped. Subsequently, he finds himself with the practical 
necessity to be generous and he indirectly freely gives generously. Slow-Developing 
Joe, however, develops a qualitatively identical practical necessity to be generous in 
the hard-won way—namely, through choosing to be generous and omitting stingy 
actions over a long period of time. Both Revamped Joe and Slow-Developing Joe 
contribute to their character through directly free actions and their practical necessi-
ties counterfactually depend on those directly free actions. Again, it is intuitive that 
there is a moral difference between them.
What kind of moral difference obtains in these cases? My diagnosis is that even 
though Chuck and Instant Chuck are equally bad persons, Chuck deserves more 
blame than Instant Chuck both for his practical necessity and his indirectly free 
action (cf. Hartman 2017, pp. 124–139). Likewise, although Slow-Developing Joe 
and Revamped Joe are equally good persons, Slow-Developing Joe deserves more 
praise than Revamped Joe both for his practical necessity and his indirectly free 
action.
Let us consider first the claim about Chuck’s being more blameworthy for his 
practical necessity to murder and Slow-Developing Joe’s being more praiseworthy 
for his practical necessity to give generously. Why think that claim is true? Chuck’s 
and Slow-Developing Joe’s practical necessities are more of their own doing than 
the practical necessities of their counterparts. Chuck performed many actions to 
develop his practical necessity, whereas Instant Chuck performed only one such 
action. Chuck also had more opportunities than Instant Chuck to avoid having that 
practical necessity. Likewise, Slow-Developing Joe performed many more actions 
and omissions to bring about his practical necessity in comparison with Revamped 
Joe; he also expended greater moral effort to develop the practical necessity. The 
general lesson is that the degree to which a practical necessity is of the agent’s own 
making has implications for her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness with respect 
to the practical necessity.
If we grant these differential praiseworthiness and blameworthiness attributions 
for practical necessities—as I think we should—does it follow also that Chuck and 
Slow-Developing Joe are respectively more praiseworthy or blameworthy in virtue 
of their indirectly free actions? I think it does. As O’Connor (2009, p. 123) recog-
nizes in the context of directly free actions, the degree of a person’s freedom and 
responsibility for an action is partially a function of the degree to which the factors 
that influence her choice are of her own making. This is one reason why, in general, 
properly functioning teenagers are less free and responsible than properly function-
ing adults, and it is one reason why, in general, properly functioning adults without 
manipulated character are more free and responsible with respect to their actions 
than properly functioning adults who have their character manipulated to various 
degrees. This idea plausibly applies also to indirectly free actions; the degree of a 
person’s indirect freedom and responsibility for a practically necessitated action 
is partially a function of the degree to which her practical necessity is of her own 
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making.10 So, Chuck’s practically necessitated murder is more indirectly free and 
blameworthy than Instant Chuck’s practically necessitated murder, because consti-
tutive luck plays less of a role in generating Chuck’s indirectly free actions.11 The 
same applies mutatis mutandis to Slow Developing Joe but with respect to circum-
stantial luck, which is the kind of luck that occurs when the morally significant chal-
lenges or opportunities a person has are determined by factors beyond her control 
(Nagel 1979, p. 28).
Here, then, is a third metaphysical condition: the degree of a person’s praisewor-
thiness or blameworthiness for an indirectly free action is at least partially a func-
tion of the agent’s history of forming the practical necessity, which includes (i) the 
quantity and quality of her directly free actions and omissions that make a difference 
to acquiring the practical necessity and (ii) the quantity and quality of her opportuni-
ties to avoid acquiring the practical necessity.
Nevertheless, these three conditions do not exhaust all that needs to be said about 
the historical metaphysics of indirectly free actions. For we do not think that just any 
directly free action or omission on which a practical necessity counterfactually depends 
should count toward her moral responsibility for her practical necessity and practically 
necessitated actions. For example, consider Jan who chooses to become courageous for 
its own sake. Later in life, however, she develops a practical necessity to murder, and 
her courage is taken up as part of the bundle of dispositions that constitute that practical 
necessity. Jan*, however, is a qualitative duplicate of Jan with only the historical differ-
ence that she is courageous as a matter of constitutive luck. It follows, then, that Jan’s 
practical necessity is more of her own doing than Jan*’s practical necessity. So, the 
third condition appears to imply that Jan is more blameworthy for her murderous practi-
cal necessity and practically necessitated action, which is the wrong result.
What we need, then, is a fourth metaphysical condition that adequately specifies 
the kinds of directly free actions (courageous, lascivious, just, etc.) that can transfer 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness to a certain kind of practical necessity and 
can partially fix the degree of a person’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness for 
an indirectly free action.12
One might think that the fourth condition is that directly free actions cannot be 
related by luck to the practical necessity. Since Jan’s courageous directly free actions 
11 Mckenna (2004, p. 183) would likely say that although Chuck is clearly more morally responsible 
than Instant Chuck, it does not thereby follow that Chuck is more blameworthy for his practically neces-
sitated action, because Chuck could just be more blameworthy for the practical necessity and/or more 
blameworthy due to having performed more past directly free actions. Although I view this as the best 
line of defense against my view, I believe that my application of O’Connor’s insight is correct.
12 My discussion of this fourth condition is indebted to Peels’s (2017, pp. 215–218) non-accidental con-
dition on being derivatively responsible for beliefs.
10 In my view, it is possible for a person who has not created anything about herself (such as an instant 
agent) to act freely and responsibly to some marginal degree—or at least for such a person to eventually 
act freely and responsibly to some marginal degree. Thus, the view on offer is compatible with the nega-
tion of the moral premise in Strawson’s (1994, p. 5) argument for the impossibility of moral responsibil-
ity—that is, the claim that a person must be truly morally responsible for creating at least some features 
of herself that explain her action to be truly morally responsible (to any degree) for her action. For an 
argument against Strawson’s moral premise, see Hartman (forthcoming-a).
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performed earlier in life are related by luck to the later developed practical necessity, 
those courageous directly free actions are not relevant to determining how blame-
worthy she is for her indirectly free action. But this proposal has a costly implica-
tion. Because virtually all directly free actions that eventually make a difference to 
acquiring a practical necessity do so at least partially as a matter of resultant luck—
that is, luck in the way one’s action or omission turns out (Nagel 1979, p. 28)—
this proposal implies that virtually no directly free actions count toward the agent’s 
moral responsibility for her practical necessity, which implies that there are virtually 
no indirectly free actions. Why think that almost all directly free actions that make 
a difference to having a practical necessity do so partially as a matter of resultant 
luck? Consider the way in which a person’s action or omission affects her dispo-
sitions is typically insufficient to yield a practical necessity. It is only after many 
such choices and external influences are diachronically compounded that a person’s 
dispositions become sufficiently strong to constitute a practical necessity. Thus, it 
is almost always at least partially a matter of resultant luck whether a particular 
directly free action or omission changes her dispositions in a way that eventually 
gives rise to a practical necessity.
Another proposal is that the directly free actions that should contribute to the 
degree of moral responsibility for a practical necessity are those that are sufficiently 
like the practical necessity. The relevant kind of similarity involves at least moral 
valence consistency. So, only morally bad (and neutral) directly free actions can 
contribute to morally bad practical necessities and indirectly free actions, and only 
morally good (and neutral) directly free actions can contribute to morally good prac-
tical necessities and indirectly free actions. Directly free actions in which the agent 
aims to acquire courage for its own sake have a good moral valence. Thus, accord-
ing to this baseline consistency criterion, the courageous directly free actions are 
not candidates for the relevant kind of counterfactual dependence and do not count 
toward the degree of Jan’s blameworthiness. This proposal, then, nicely solves the 
problem.
This similarity condition, however, requires further specification. I propose that 
intrinsic features of the practical necessity should determine the parameters of fur-
ther specification. An agent is practically necessitated to murder, for example, only 
in a certain kind of circumstance and in a certain kind of way—not always and eve-
rywhere. If the practically necessitated murder is stably motivated, for example, not 
only by an interest in violence but also in greed and envy, then violent, greedy, and 
envious directly free actions that make a difference to having the practical necessity 
transfer moral responsibility to it and to the indirectly free action. Thus, the kinds of 
directly free actions that are relevant to moral responsibility transfer are those that 
adequately resemble the intrinsic nuances of the practical necessity itself.13
In summary, Indirect Libertarians should endorse four historical metaphysical 
considerations on indirectly free actions. The first two considerations are necessary 
13 One might instead want to adopt a normalcy condition according to which only the directly free 
actions that make a difference to acquiring a practical necessity and normally do so are the ones that 




conditions on acting indirectly freely. An agent acts indirectly freely only if her 
practical necessity counterfactually depends on past directly free actions, and those 
directly free actions bear an adequate degree of similarity to the practical necessity. 
The second two considerations set parameters on the degree of praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness an agent earns for her indirectly free action. The agent need not 
have generated the practical necessity ex nihilo by directly free actions to be fully 
praiseworthy or blameworthy for the indirectly free action that issues from it, and 
the agent’s degree of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness for an indirectly free 
action is determined in part by (i) the quantity and quality of her directly free actions 
and omissions that make a difference to acquiring the practical necessity and (ii) the 
quantity and quality of her opportunities to avoid acquiring the practical necessity. 
In the next section, I examine the required epistemic connection between directly 
free actions and indirectly free actions.
3  The Epistemic History Condition
In general, Indirect Libertarians fail to consider the kind of epistemic connection 
that must obtain between an agent’s directly free actions, practical necessity, and 
indirectly free action. Kane (1996a, b), for example, entirely omits discussion of it. 
The terrain here, however, is better covered than in the previous section due espe-
cially to the work of Fischer and Neal Tognazzini (2009), Seth Shabo (2015), and 
Timpe (2011).
Let us begin by considering Manuel Vargas’s (2005, p. 274) Epistemic Condi-
tion on moral responsibility, which I reword to focus exclusively on indirectly free 
actions.
VEC: An agent acts indirectly freely only if that outcome was reasonably fore-
seeable at an earlier time at which she performed the directly free actions that 
eventually contributed to the relevant practical necessity.
Vargas (2005, p. 271) argues that VEC is satisfied less often than we suppose by 
generalizing from several examples (cf. McKenna 2008, p. 33).14 I focus on his case 
Jeff the Jerk: Jeff is a middle-manager who is commissioned to lay off his employ-
ees, but does so in a gratuitously rude and insensitive manner. Suppose that Jeff’s 
jerkiness practically necessitates firing his employees in that way, because he has 
a practical necessity to behave like a jerk in circumstances in which he can get 
away with it unscathed. To ascertain whether Jeff’s practically necessitated action 
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the relevant directly free actions, we must 
consult his history. Fifteen-year-old Jeff was much less successful than he liked in 
14 Although all libertarians face the epistemic problem of not knowing whether determinism is true (cf. 
Maier 2013; van Inwagen 1983; Sehon 2013), Matheson (2017, pp. 300–301) points out that Indirect 
Libertarians who hold that directly free actions necessarily involve torn decisions are encumbered with 
an additional epistemic difficulty. It is, after all, unclear from observing a practically necessitated action 




getting the attention of his attractive classmates, and he noticed that people who we 
might describe as jerks were having more success. So, he decided to inculcate jerk-
like attitudes and behaviors in himself to get their attention. “With surprisingly little 
effort, he succeeded. In fact he more than succeeded—it didn’t even take the whole 
academic year for him to go from being jerk-like to being a full-on jerk” (Vargas 
2005, p. 276). But when he decided to become a jerk and behave in jerky ways, he 
never conceived that it would result in the despicable firing of his employees. So, 
when Jeff performed directly free actions, it was not reasonably foreseeable that he 
would be practically necessitated to fire those employees in a rude and insensitive 
way. Since VEC implies that no one is morally responsible for an outcome that they 
could not reasonably be expected to foresee, Jeff is not morally accountable for his 
practically necessitated action, and so does not act indirectly freely.
How might Indirect Libertarians respond to this challenge that there are very few 
indirectly free actions on account of our limited foresight? One prominent response 
advocated by Fischer and Tognazzini (2009) is to explain how Jeff’s practically 
necessitated action was reasonably foreseeable.15 In their estimation, Vargas’s case 
seems compelling only due to the specificity of Jeff’s future practically necessitated 
action—namely, Jeff could not reasonably have been expected to foresee the conse-
quence of that despicable firing of those future employees at that company. But VEC 
does not specify the level of descriptive generality. Consider, for example, three lev-
els of description offered by Fischer and Tognazzini (2009, p. 537):
(Level 1) “Jeff fires those employees who work for that company on that pre-
cise day in that precise manner.”
(Level 2) “Jeff fires some of his employees at some company or other at some 
point in the future in a despicable manner as a result of his jerky character.”
(Level 3) “Jeff treats some people poorly at some point in the future as a result 
of his jerky character.”
Fischer and Tognazzini (2009, pp. 537–538) plausibly contend that although Jeff’s 
action at description Level 1 and Level 2 is not reasonably foreseeable, his action is 
reasonably foreseeable at description Level 3. Furthermore, a plausible version of 
VEC requires reasonable foreseeability at only description Level 3, because what 
matters is not the exact details of the foreseeable outcome but rather its general mor-
ally significant features. When we construe the outcome in VEC at Level 3, our 
practically necessitated actions often satisfy that necessary condition, and so are 
often candidates for being indirectly free actions.
Timpe (2011) supports Fischer and Tognazzini’s response by providing an 
“improved epistemic condition” (IEC) that further explains their judgments. I expli-
cate only the part of Timpe’s (2011, pp. 19–20) IEC that concerns the nature of 
15 Fischer and Tognazzini (2009, p. 554n16) take their response to apply only to derivative moral 
responsibility and not necessarily also to derivative blameworthiness.
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indirectly free actions and seems at least minimally plausible for libertarians.16 I 
also reword IEC to use the terminology in this paper and rename it as Timpe’s Epis-
temic Condition.
TEC: An agent acts indirectly freely only if at the earlier time when she per-
formed directly free actions, she had at least reasonable and merely disposi-
tional beliefs that performing those directly free actions might lead to perform-
ing an action of a similar kind in the future (or was culpable for failing to have 
those beliefs).
Five features of TEC merit explication. First, the modifier ‘reasonable’ refers to 
being sufficiently justified by evidence, but TEC leaves open which account of jus-
tification is best to use. Second, the ‘might lead to’ relation should be understood 
as stronger than ‘possibly leads to’ and as weaker than ‘would lead to’ and ‘must 
lead to,’ but the precise probability that is required for moral responsibility transfer 
is determined contextually (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 50n21). An important 
part of that contextual determination is how serious the outcome is (Timpe 2011, p. 
18). For example, if the practically necessitated action would be very harmful, only 
a very small probability would be required to ground a moral responsibility transfer.
Third, it is unnecessary that the agent have knowledge or an occurrent belief 
about the relationship between her directly free action(s) and the practically neces-
sitated action, because only a dispositional belief is required to preserve moral 
responsibility transfer (cf. Peels 2017, p. 177). It is, however, worth pointing out 
that whether the belief is occurrent or merely dispositional may affect her degree of 
moral responsibility. An agent would be more blameworthy for performing a mor-
ally wrong action with the occurrent belief that the action is wrong than she would 
be with a merely dispositional belief, all other things being equal.
Fourth, Timpe (2011, pp. 22–23) does not commit to an account of culpable 
ignorance. He points toward a non-tracing account of culpable ignorance, because 
he asserts that a problematic circularity would follow if TEC, a tracing condition, 
itself appeals to tracing. But I do not see what motivates that circularity claim. Con-
sider the way in which a generic tracing view of culpable ignorance would apply. An 
indirectly free action traces back to the agent’s past culpably ignorant directly free 
actions that in turn trace back further to a time at which she should have improved 
her epistemic condition but fails to do so in a way suitable to incur blameworthiness. 
At this level of generality, we should be able to see the problematic circularity, and 
there is none to be found. For this reason, I suggest that both tracing and non-tracing 
accounts of culpable ignorance are consistent with TEC, but leave it open which 
account Indirect Libertarians should adopt.
Fifth, TEC does not address questions about belief content. First, how general 
should the description of the future action be? It appears that Timpe has description 
16 I omit consideration of Timpe’s conjunctive epistemic condition for the past directly free actions, 
because I am assuming that all epistemic and metaphysical conditions about directly free actions have 
been satisfied. I omit inclusion of Timpe’s disjunctive condition about concomitant ignorance, because, 
in my view, it is an ethically and metaphysically implausible disjunct for libertarians.
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Level 3 in mind, and this seems plausible. Second, must Jeff merely believe that 
his performing jerky actions will make him more likely to become a jerk and per-
form jerky actions in the future, or must Jeff also believe that if he performs enough 
jerky actions that his future jerky actions might be practically necessitated? Given 
Level 3 generality, it seems plausible that the required belief need be only that his 
jerky actions might lead to his becoming a jerk and performing future jerky actions. 
Third, must Jeff actually believe the proposition expressed in Level 3 description, or 
is it enough that he would immediately draw the conclusion if he were asked a ques-
tion about it given his other beliefs? To satisfy the non-culpable ignorance clause 
of TEC, he needs to believe it. After all, if Jeff does not even merely dispositionally 
believe the Level 3 generality proposition, he is ignorant. Even so, he could still sat-
isfy the culpable ignorance clause of TEC.
With this explication of TEC in hand, let us apply it to Jeff the Jerk. It is plausible 
to think that Jeff had occurrent beliefs that becoming a jerk might lead to his treating 
people badly in the future due to his jerkiness, but, even if he did not, he very plau-
sibly had at least merely dispositional and reasonable beliefs about it. And because 
intentionally acquiring bad character is a very serious affair due to its high likeli-
hood of producing future harm, he need not even think it was very probable that 
such current jerky actions would lead to performing more in the future. Therefore, 
it is very plausible to suppose that Jeff satisfies TEC, and that he is morally respon-
sible for the jerky way in which he fires his employees, at least with respect to the 
epistemic condition.
Jeff’s case is a case of a person who sets out to become a certain way, but, in the 
more common kind of case, people do not aim to become the kind of people they do 
become. Let us consider whether TEC can handle this latter kind of case.
Shabo’s (2015, pp. 996–999) Greg the Greedy is tasked to recommend budget 
cuts. His superiors expect that he will recommend deep cuts that will result in the 
termination of employees, and, in return for those cuts, it is insinuated that Greg 
would receive a fiscal bonus. Greg’s options are to (i) disregard the expectation of 
his superiors and fail to get the bonus, (ii) recommend minimal layoffs and get the 
bonus, or (iii) exceed their layoff expectations and hope for a slightly larger bonus. 
Greg’s greed and inability to identify with the needs and interests of his social infe-
riors practically necessitate his choice to exceed their layoff expectations.
Does Greg act indirectly freely? To answer this question, we must consult his 
history. Greg moved to a new school in seventh grade (2015, p. 996–997). He was 
naturally insecure, and “instinctively emulated” the cool kids, who acted like jerks. 
He never decided to do this. After receiving “positive reinforcement,” he continued 
to “gradually and unreflectively adjust his demeanor to theirs.” He knew that his 
disdain and ridicule made others angry, but this did not trouble him. As he became 
more confident later in high school and college, he relied on this jerky behavior less, 
but he continued to divide up the world into “big shots” and “nobodies.” On his first 
job out of college, he was impressed by his aloof and greedy superiors, and he con-
sciously emulated them. He became focused on acquiring wealth.
Was Greg’s firing more employees than expected a reasonably foreseeable out-
come of those earlier directly free actions? Shabo (2015, pp. 998–999) argues that 
the answer is plausibly ‘no’ by canvassing candidate actions and omissions: (i) 
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Greg’s decision in high school to act obnoxiously toward a nobody, (ii) Greg’s omis-
sion to reevaluate his behavior in light of being blamed by nobodies, (iii) Greg’s 
omission to reevaluate his behavior in light of perceiving in himself a clear pattern 
of obnoxious behavior, (iv) Greg’s latest belittlement that culminates in a tendency 
to be unmoved by the needs and interests of perceived social inferiors, (v) Greg’s 
decision in college to stop acting obnoxiously for social utility but ignoring the ethi-
cal reasons to do so, (vi) Greg’s inability to be moved by the interests of nobod-
ies becomes settled, and (vii) Greg’s conscious decision to emulate his superiors 
at work. Shabo (2015, p. 999) concludes that “there seems to be no single episode 
such that Greg could have been expected to recognize that he was risking signifi-
cant hardship or deep-seated indifference to others … by his behavior then.” Shabo 
(2015, p. 997), then, holds that Greg’s practically necessitated action was not rea-
sonably foreseeable, which presents a clear challenge to the Fischer and Tognazzini 
strategy.17
What I want to highlight is that TEC is well-suited to handle this kind of case. 
Recall that TEC does not require that there is a single episode such that Greg occur-
rently believed or knew that his actions risked developing indifference to nobod-
ies. Rather, TEC requires that Greg had at least merely dispositional and reasonable 
beliefs that performing the directly free actions might lead to being unmoved by the 
needs and interests of perceived social inferiors and might lead to imposing needless 
hardship on nobodies.
It seems plausible that Greg had those beliefs at, for example, (iii)—that is, his 
omission to reevaluate his behavior in light of perceiving in himself a clear pattern 
of obnoxious behavior. His perceiving this clear pattern was occurrent, and it is very 
plausible that this occurrent recognition generated at least the merely dispositional 
belief that the pattern would continue into the future unless he decided to change 
his ways, which is something he omitted to do. Thus, at the very least he had the 
relevant merely dispositional belief when he performed jerky actions and omissions 
after this time. The probability assessment about performing future jerky actions 
could even have been low due to the significant harm they project.
If, however, Greg did not have even those beliefs (and he was not culpably igno-
rant for failing to have them), Greg’s directly free actions that developed the ten-
dency to be unmoved by the needs and interests of his perceived social inferiors 
would not contribute to his degree of responsibility for his indirectly free action. 
Nevertheless, Greg would still be blameworthy to some lesser degree for his indi-
rectly free action. After all, the practical necessity that issues in the action counter-
factually depends also on his greedy actions at (vii), and he plausibly had at least a 
merely dispositional belief that his conscious choice to emulate his greedy superiors 
at work might lead to treating people badly in the interest of personal gain in the 
17 Shabo believes that Greg is morally responsible for his practically necessitated action, and so believes 
that a person can be blameworthy for an outcome even if it was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
a past directly free action. Rogers (2015, p. 234) takes a similar position: “…you don’t need to grasp that 
you are forming your character to be responsible for forming it.” Although I regard Shabo and Rogers’s 




future, especially if he observed his superiors doing this. In this case, then, Greg’s 
indirectly free action would trace back to his emulating his bosses at work, and 
so TEC can preserve the moral responsibility transfer from previous directly free 
actions to Greg’s indirectly free action. Of course, Greg would be less blameworthy 
for his indirectly free action than he would have been if he had the relevant beliefs 
during (iii) as well. I conclude that TEC is fit to handle a broad range of cases, and 
is a plausible position for Indirect Libertarians to take. In the next section, I explore 
the nature of indirectly free actions further by considering the nature of derivative 
moral responsibility.
4  Derivative Responsibility and Resultant Moral Luck
No Indirect Libertarian, as far as I am aware, has taken up the question about how 
to understand the nature of derivative moral responsibility of indirectly free actions 
with respect to whether resultant moral luck exists.18 Resultant moral luck occurs 
when the consequence of an agent’s directly free action or omission is at least par-
tially beyond her control, and that consequence positively affects how much praise 
or blame she deserves. This kind of moral luck is relevant to indirectly free actions 
precisely because it is at least partially a matter of resultant luck whether a directly 
free action or omission changes her dispositions in a way that eventually gives rise 
to a practical necessity.
Return to the Luther case. On the supposition that the resultant luck in the 
Luther case is resultant moral luck, Luther is more praiseworthy overall in virtue 
of his practical necessity and his indirectly free action than the degree to which he 
is praiseworthy for earlier directly free actions relevant to developing the practical 
necessity. In particular, Luther is more praiseworthy overall for acting indirectly 
freely than he would have been if he had the practical necessity but had not per-
formed the indirectly free action. This moral evaluation of Luther’s action seems to 
me to be exactly right; thus, my own view is that the most plausible account of indi-
rectly free actions is committed to the existence of resultant moral luck.19
It is important to recognize, however, that accepting extant resultant moral luck is 
not required by the nature of indirectly free actions. The most plausible way to deny 
resultant moral luck and yet affirm indirectly free actions is to make a distinction 
between the “degree” and “scope” of moral responsibility (Zimmerman 2002, pp. 
560–561; cf. Peels 2017, p. 224). The degree of moral responsibility is about how 
much praise and blame the agent deserves, and this kind of moral responsibility can-
not be affected by luck. But the scope of moral responsibility concerns merely the 
events for which an agent is morally responsible; this kind of moral responsibility 
18 Tognazzini (2011) notices that Kane’s libertarianism fits nicely with accepting resultant moral luck.
19 Even if we suppose that indirectly free actions typically or even always involve resultant moral luck 
as they occur in the actual world, it is at least possible that one could act indirectly freely in a way that 
involves no resultant moral luck because there is no resultant luck involved. I am inclined to think that all 
realistic cases of indirectly free actions involve resultant moral luck.
 R. J. Hartman 
1 3
may be affected by luck. Apply this distinction to the Luther case. Since it is at least 
partially a matter of resultant luck whether Luther’s previous directly free actions 
would eventually form a practical necessity (after all, he might have been stuck by 
lightning after performing them and died having never acquired the practical neces-
sity), he is responsible for his practical necessity and his indirectly free action in the 
scope sense only (cf. Simkulet 2015). Thus, Luther’s indirectly free action does not 
contribute to his overall praiseworthiness; his earlier directly free actions exhaust 
how much praise he deserves. He is, of course, morally responsible for his prac-
tically necessitated action, and so the denial of resultant moral luck is compatible 
with acting indirectly freely.
Even though endorsing indirectly free actions does not require accepting resultant 
moral luck, I do think that their conjunction is plausible. In particular, I contend that 
accepting resultant moral luck is theoretically motivated for Indirect Libertarians 
in part because they tend to accept the existence of circumstantial and constitutive 
moral luck.
Circumstantial moral luck occurs when it is outside of the agent’s control whether 
she faces a morally significant challenge or opportunity, and it positively affects 
her praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. Constitutive moral luck occurs when an 
agent’s dispositions or capacities are not voluntarily acquired, and they positively 
affect how much praise or blame she deserves for a trait or an action. One way to 
see why Indirect Libertarians tend to accept these kinds of moral luck is to show 
they cannot or would not want to deny them. Indirect Libertarians cannot deny 
these kinds of moral luck by factoring out all luck from moral responsibility as Neil 
Levy (2011), Galen Strawson (1994), and Bruce Waller (2011) suggest that they do, 
because the result would be that no one would be positively praiseworthy or blame-
worthy for anything, which is incompatible with the libertarian commitment that we 
at least sometimes act freely and responsibly. Indirect Libertarians would not want 
to deny these kinds of moral luck by allowing people to be morally responsible in 
virtue of what they would directly freely do in non-actual circumstances and with 
non-actual constitutive properties as Michael Zimmerman (2002) suggests that they 
do, because at least most Indirect Libertarians deny that such counterfactuals can be 
true (O’Connor 1992; van Inwagen 1997; Zimmerman 2011; cf. Hartman 2017, pp. 
71–80).20 Thus, Indirect Libertarians tend to accept extant circumstantial and consti-
tutive moral luck, because they do not endorse the main ways to deny these kinds of 
moral luck.
Accepting circumstantial moral luck, however, provides good analogical evidence 
for endorsing resultant moral luck (Hartman 2017, pp. 105–111).21 I sketch the argu-
ment concretely in terms of three examples. No Start, our first character, gets into 
her car to drive home in an angry mood, but her car does not start. As a result, she 
has to call a cab to take her home. Merely Reckless, our second character, gets into 
20 Even if such counterfactuals could be true, Indirect Libertarians would very likely think that Zimmer-
man’s (2002) position is morally implausible for reasons I offer in Hartman (2017, pp. 65–70; forthcom-
ing-b).
21 This argument bears some similarities to one offered by Moore (1997, p. 237).
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her car to drive home in the same angry mood. But because her car starts, she drives 
homeward in anger, and she luckily makes it there without incident. The compara-
tive case of No Start and Merely Reckless is a standard example of circumstantial 
luck. Given that the Indirect Libertarian accepts circumstantial moral luck, Merely 
Reckless is more blameworthy than No Start in a way that is partially determined by 
luck, because luck in opportunity allows only Merely Reckless to sustain her inten-
tion into overt action. Killer, our third character, also gets into her car to drive home 
in the same angry mood, but her reckless driving ends up killing a pedestrian. Sup-
pose that Merely Reckless would have killed a pedestrian in the same way if there 
had been a pedestrian on the road for her to kill. The case of Merely Reckless and 
Killer is a standard example of resultant luck.
Notice three ways in which the circumstantial luck case of No Start and Merely 
Reckless, on the one hand, is analogous to the resultant luck case of Merely Reck-
less and Killer, on the other. First, luck is the salient difference between the agents in 
both case pairs—whether the car starts and whether there is a pedestrian on the road. 
Second, the event for which the agent in each case pair might be more blamewor-
thy depends at least in part on that person’s own agency. Merely Reckless’s driving 
depends on her agency, and Killer’s causing the death of a pedestrian depends on 
her agency. Third, the agent who might be more blameworthy in each case pair had 
at least a fair opportunity to avoid being additionally blameworthy in that way. In 
the case of No Start and Merely Reckless, Merely Reckless had a fair opportunity to 
avoid driving recklessly, because she could have directly freely chosen to avoid driv-
ing while she was angry. In the case of Merely Reckless and Killer, Killer had a fair 
opportunity to avoid killing a pedestrian, because she also could have directly freely 
chosen to avoid driving while she was angry; and killing a pedestrian is a foresee-
able consequence of reckless driving. Plausibly, similarities of these kinds are what 
led David Enoch and Ehud Guttel (2010, p. 376) to assert that “The problem of 
moral luck seems to be the very same problem whether it is luck in consequences or 
in circumstances, and is typically so treated in the literature.”
Thus, given the differential desert that Merely Reckless is more blameworthy than 
No Start in a way partially determined by luck and these three similarities between 
the case pairs, we have good analogical evidence that Killer is more blameworthy 
than Merely Reckless in a way that is partially determined by luck. The Indirect Lib-
ertarian who accepts circumstantial and constitutive moral luck has a built-in reason 
to affirm extant resultant moral luck.
In summary, although Indirect Libertarians can consistently deny resultant moral 
luck, I suggest that the most intuitive evaluation of Luther’s indirectly free action 
involves accepting resultant moral luck, and that Indirect Libertarians have an inde-
pendent reason to affirm resultant moral luck based on the analogical argument. The 
Indirect Libertarian may thus plausibly regard Luther as more praiseworthy over-
all for performing the indirectly free action than he is merely for performing the 




I have compiled various partial accounts of indirectly free actions into a single 
account, refined some of those partial accounts to make them more plausible, and 
filled in gaps left by the compilation of these partial accounts. In particular, I added 
two metaphysical historical conditions, made some clarifications to TEC and applied 
it to a new kind of case, and argued that an attractive view of indirectly free actions 
involves accepting resultant moral luck.
Here is the account. An agent acts indirectly freely if and only if she has per-
formed past directly free actions such that (i) she had at least reasonable disposi-
tional beliefs at the time of the directly free actions that those actions might lead 
to performing an action of a similar kind in the future (or was culpable for failing 
to have those beliefs), (ii) her practical necessity counterfactually depends on those 
directly free actions, and (iii) those directly free actions bear an adequate similarity 
to the practical necessity. Furthermore, she need not have generated the whole prac-
tical necessity by directly free actions to be fully praiseworthy or blameworthy for 
the indirectly free action, and how praiseworthy or blameworthy she is for the indi-
rectly free action is determined in part by (i) the quantity and quality of her directly 
free actions and omissions that make a difference to acquiring the practical neces-
sity, (ii) the quantity and quality of her opportunities to avoid acquiring the practical 
necessity, and (iii) whether the reasonable belief about the future outcome of the 
directly free actions is occurrent or merely dispositional.22
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